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Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health
Professions: Developing a






The current spate of antitrust litigation challenging profes-
sional activities raises fundamental questions about the future role
of professional groups in a more competitive health care market.
Since the formation of medieval craftmen's guilds, individuals en-
gaged in similar or competitive business and professional pursuits
have banded together to seek solutions to common problems.' As-
sociations of health professionals have long been engaged in
promulgating and enforcing private regulations governing educa-
tional standards, admission to practice, ethical business practices,
and relationships with other professional groups.2 Indeed, autono-
mous control over the content of their work may be what distin-
guishes professions from mere occupations.3 History, however, has
taught us that the delegation of regulatory functions to private
groups provides ample opportunities for abuse of this authority
and may have significant anticompetitive effects.4 Thus, it is im-
* Attorney Advisor, Office of Policy Planning, Federal Trade Commission. B.A., 1973,
Yale University; J.D., 1980, University of California, Boalt Hall.
** Health Policy Coordinator and Attorney Advisor, Office of Policy Planning, Federal
Trade Commission. A.B., 1969, University of Michigan; J.D., 1972, M.P.H., 1974, Harvard
University.
1. M. THOMPSON, ANTITRUST AND THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER 107-08 (1979).
2. See R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1971); Grad, The
Antitrust Laws and Professional Discipline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE L.J. 443.
3. E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE (1970).
4. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Group
Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 237 P.2d 737 (Wash. 1951); Grad, supra note 2,
at 457-84; Havighurst, Antitrust Enforcement in the Medical Services Industry, 58
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 89 (1980).
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portant to distinguish legitimate self-regulatory actions intended
to improve the profession from unwarranted restraints on profes-
sional practice that are designed to stifle competition and impede
innovation.
The challenge for the courts, as well as the agencies responsi-
ble for enforcing the antitrust statutes, in dealing with the health
professions, is to establish parameters for acceptable self-regula-
tion. It is clear after Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar5 and National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States' that the pro-
fessions are subject to the antitrust laws. At the same time, how-
ever, it is doubtful that anyone else could promulgate and adminis-
ter professional regulations any better than the professional groups
themselves. The history and benefits of self-regulation may explain
the strong hints by the Supreme Court7 that the professions do
differ from commercial enterprise in some respects and, therefore,
may merit a more thoroughgoing review of the impact of alleged
illegal practices than would be conducted in other, nonprofessional
contexts.
Establishing criteria for legally acceptable behavior for profes-
sional associations will be an iterative process. It is difficult to
draw distinct lines today, mainly because it is impossible to foresee
all the possible effects of various professionally imposed restraints.
Line drawing of this sort cannot be done in the abstract. What
does seem feasible is to consider the different types of antitrust
analysis that might be applied in scrutinizing certain restraints
and to indicate, in general terms, the type of framework that would
be most appropriate for courts to employ when considering partic-
ular professional practices. This Article attempts to do just that.
First, however, the Article reviews the changes that have occurred
over the years in the health services market that will necessitate an
increase in antitrust enforcement activity during the 1980s.
II. THE NEED FOR ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1980s
The market for professional health services has changed con-
siderably in recent years. Variations in how physicians and other
health professionals deliver their services are numerous and are in-
creasing. Fee-for-service practice is no longer the only alternative
for recent medical school graduates. Today, a physician can join a
5. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
6. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
7. 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17; 435 U.S. at 696.
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prepaid health maintenance organization (HMO)a or individual
practice association (WPA), 9 a primary care network (PCN),10 a
multispecialty (but not prepaid) group,1 or work in one of several
government-sponsored medical care settings, in addition to hang-
ing out his or her shingle and working alone.12 Moreover, physi-
cians now have the option of working with nonphysician provid-
ers-such as nurse midwives, nurse practitioners, or physicians'
assistants-to expand their practices and increase their own
productivity.
The reasons for such significant innovation and change in the
delivery of health services are threefold. First, the supply of health
professionals increased dramatically during the 1970s. Among phy-
sicians alone, the number of medical school graduates increased by
65 percent,13 and the number of newly licensed physicians almost
doubled during the decade. 4 The existing health care delivery sys-
tem did not easily absorb this quantum jump in the supply of
manpower and consequently interest in alternative forms of prac-
tice grew among new entrants.
8. For the definition of a federally qualified HMO, see 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1976). In
general, an HMO is an organized system of health care financing and delivery which pro-
vides comprehensive health services to voluntarily enrolled members who pay a fixed annual
or periodic fee. AMmRicAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF TM COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SER-
vcz (1980). See also H. LuST, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF PER-
FORMANCE 2-3 (1981).
9. IPAs are a type of HMO in which participating physicians maintain their own indi-
vidual office practices and are paid on a fee-for-service basis out of a common fund. See
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS CAN HELP CONTROL
HEALTH CARE COSTS 8 (1980).
10. A PCN is a delivery system based on a primary care physician-such as a pediatri-
cian, family practitioner, or general internist-who agrees to provide all basic services and
then arrange, as well as supervise, all referrals to specialists. The primary care physician is
paid a fixed amount by his patients, depending on their age and sex, thereby creating the
proper economic incentives for him to monitor the use of expensive specialists and hospital
services. The best examples of this approach are the SAFECO Life Insurance Company
plans in California and Washington.
11. A multispecialty group usually consists of a partnership or corporate structure for
the associated practices of a group of fee-for-service physicians. This type of group practice
offers participating physicians immediate access to referral physicians, backup during emer-
gencies or vacations, and opportunities for peer review. Patients also benefit in terms of
continuity of care and one-stop shopping.
12. See A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 55-69 (1980), for a detailed description of alterna-
tive delivery systems. While these systems deliver care to less than 5% of the U.S. popula-
tion, they are growing, and new ones are being developed, in key metropolitan areas like
Washington, D.C., Boston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco.
13. Medical Education in the United States 1978-1979, 243 J.A.M.A. 841, 852 (1980).
14. L. WUNDERMAN, PHYSICIAN DISTmUTION AND MEDICAL LiCENSURE IN THE U.S. 357
(1979).
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Second, increases in the costs of medical and hospital care ex-
ceeded the rise in the Consumer Price Index throughout the dec-
ade and prompted reformers to suggest a number of options for
controlling costs.15 Early in the decade it was well established
among leading economists that the health services market does not
respond to the normal forces of supply and demand."8 In 1972,
Fuchs and Kramer published a study that concluded that physi-
cians can and do determine the demand for their own services.
17
This finding provided a theoretical base for a number of regulatory
initiatives, like Professional Standards Review Organizations
(PSROs) 8 and health planning,"' designed to control physicians'
practice patterns. By the end of the decade, however, objective
analysis of some of these regulatory programs revealed that physi-
cian-focused regulation could not achieve the hoped-for health sys-
15. Z. DYCKMAN, A STUDY OF PHYSICIANS' FEES 1 (1978). Proposed reforms included
limiting the supply of hospital beds, putting a cap on hospital expenditures, nationally nego-
tiated physicians' fees, increased use of HMOs to develop incentives for physicians to use
expensive resources prudently, and greater reliance on consumer choice in order to stimulate
competition among insurers and providers. See generally A. ENTHOVEN, supra note 12; V.
FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIv? (1974); J. MEYER, HEALTH CARE COST INCREASES (1979); Nol, The
Consequences of Public Utility Regulation of Hospitals, in CONTROLS ON HEALTH CARE 25
(Institute of Medicine ed. 1975); REGULATING HEALTH CARE (A. Levin ed. 1980); U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: THE CULPRIT BEHIND HEALTH CARE
COSTS? (1979); M. ZUBKOFF, I. RASKIN & R. HANlT, HOSPITAL COST CONTAINMENT (1978);
Ginsberg, Competition and Cost Containment, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1112-15 (1980); Hav-
ighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 716 (1970).
16. K. BOULDING, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC POLICY 255 (1958); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOM-
ICS 122 (2d ed. 1955); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 219-20 (3d ed. 1966). See generally
H. KLARMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH (1965); Mushkin, Toward a Definition of Health
Economics, 73 PUB. HEALTH REP. 785 (1958).
17. V. FUCHS & M. KRAMER, DETERMINANTS OF EXPENDITURES FOR PHYSICIANS' SER-
VICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1948-68 (1972). Not all health economists accepted the Fuchs-
Kramer hypothesis, however. See J. NEWHOUSE, THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE (1978);
Sloan & Feldman, Competition Among Physicians, reprinted in COMPETITION IN THE
HEALTH CARE SECTOR (W. Greenberg ed. 1978); Green, Physician Induced Demand for
Medical Care, 13 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 21 (1978).
18. PSROs were established by the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, 42 U.S.C. § 1305, to monitor the costs and quality of services provided
to federal beneficiaries under the Medicare program.
19. Health planning encompasses a number of regulatory initiatives designed to ra-
tionalize the growth of health care facilities. Federal involvement dates back to 1946 when
the Hill-Burton hospital construction program was launched as part of a post-World War H
effort to assure access to modern hospitals throughout the country. This and several other
health planning programs were consolidated in the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300e-14a (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), as amended
by Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79,
93 Stat. 592, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. III 1979).
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tern reform.20 In fact, "command and control" type regulation
came under substantial attack,21 and policymakers began to look
toward market-oriented reforms as an alternative.
Third, state and federal law enforcement agencies began to
challenge privately-imposed restrictions on practice under anti-
trust statutes. 22 The immediate effect of these challenges was to
allow professionals to advertise and organize themselves into com-
peting economic units.
The trends outlined above will continue in the 1980s. The
number of new physicians currently in the medical education pipe-
line indicates that our total physician supply will be over 536,000
by 1990.2s This represents a tremendous absolute increase, as well
as an increase in the ratio of physicians to population, and has
triggered predictions of an "oversupply" of physicians within the
next few years. At the same time, the continued growth in the sup-
ply of nonphysician providers-nurse practitioners, nurse mid-
wives, physicians' assistants, clinical psychologists, podiatrists, and
psychiatric social workers, for example-will create a large pool of
potential competitors as these individuals either singly, or in asso-
ciation with physicians, seek greater independence in their rela-
tionships with patients.24 This group of providers will double in
number by 1990.25
If the past is prologue, some physicians will undoubtedly re-
spond to these strong competitive pressures by seeking closer asso-
ciation with their peers--"circling the wagons"-to fend off poten-
tial competitors. Already, physician and dentist groups have found
economic boycotts to be an effective tool for stopping third party
20. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF PSRO's ON HEALTH CARE COSTS
(1979); D. SALKEVER & T. BICE, HOSPITAL C RTIFICATE-OF-NEED CONTROLS (1979).
21. See C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 16-27 (1977); Breyer, Ana-
lyzing Regulatory Failure, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547 (1979).
22. See generally Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12 AKRON
L. REV. 417 (1979); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry, 23 ST. Louis U.L.
REV. 446 (1979). For illustrative cases brought by the Federal Trade Commission, see Amer-
ican Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C 701 (1979), aff'd - F.2d _ (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 1980); Indiana
Federation of Dentists, FTC Docket No. 9118 (initial decision, March 24, 1980) (appeal to
full Commission pending); Michigan State Medical Society, FTC Docket No. 9137 (com-
plaint issued, July 27, 1979). See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HEALTH SERVICES
POLICY SESSION BRIEFING BOOK 32-45 (1979).
23. GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM., SUMMARY REPORT, 1
REPORT OF THE GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SEC-
RETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 15, 23 (1980).
24. Id. at 28-30.
25. Id. at 92-93.
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payers from imposing stringent cost containment measures. 2 Boy-
cotts also have been used to discourage the formation and growth
of HMOs. 27 Increasingly, boycott tactics are being employed in the
denial of hospital privileges, 28 cancellation of malpractice coverage
under medical society sponsored insurance plans,2 9 and termina-
tion of emergency room coverage at community hospitals that at-
tempt new methods for delivering care.30 It is not inconceivable
that providers will attempt to establish predatory pricing schemes
as another way to discourage the entry of new forms of health care
delivery. Clearly, statewide and localized concerted efforts to stifle
competition are increasing and are likely to become more common
as competitive pressures intensify.
III. EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST IN THE PROFESSIONAL CONTEXT
Application of the antitrust laws to the professions is in its
infancy. While the competitive pressures outlined in the preceding
section have been mounting for some time, the real growth of anti-
trust activity aimed at the professions can be traced to two
landmark cases 1 decided by the Supreme Court since 1975.
Prior to that time, antitrust experts doubted whether the anti-
trust laws applied at all to the "learned professions." By its terms,
the Sherman Act is limited to conduct involving "trade or com-
26. Indiana Federation of Dentists, FTC Docket No. 9118 (initial decision, March 24,
1980) (appeal to full Commission pending); Michigan State Medical Society, FTC Docket
No. 9129 (complaint issued, July 27, 1979). Havighurst feels that boycotts are the medical
profession's "ultimate defensive weapon." Havighurst, supra note 4, at 10.
27. Forbes Health System Medical Staff, 94 F.T.C. 1042 (1979); Medical Service Corp.
of Spokane County, 88 F.T.C. 906 (1976). The Department of Justice, which brought the
1943 AMA case involving the boycott of Group Health Association, American Medical Ass'n
v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), recently brought and settled a similar case. United
States v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center. [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,731. The
State of Ohio has filed a similar case, OHIO V. MAHONING COUNTY MEDICAL SOc'Y, [1980-1]
TRADE CAS. § 63,100 (N.D. Ohio 1979), in which the court rejected defendant's motion for
summary judgment. See also Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530
(5th Cir. 1978), in which the plaintiff clinic alleged and proved a conspiracy to obstruct its
operation.
28. Levin v. Doctor's Hospital, Inc., 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Robinson v.
Magovern, [1978-2] Trade Cas. 1 62,411 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
29. Nurse Midwifery: Consumers' Freedom of Choice: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 18, 1980) (denial of malpractice insurance to physicians who pro-
vided back-up services for nurse-midwives).
30. Hope, et al., FTC Docket No. 9144, [1980] 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 21,737 (consent
order).
31. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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merce," 2 and dicta in several early Supreme Court cases implied
that since professional activity could not be so characterized, it was
exempt from the Act's coverage.33 Jurisdiction was also challenged
on the basis that professional activity was purely local in nature
and therefore beyond the federal government's constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce.34
The extent of the jurisdiction and "trade or commerce" de-
fenses was raised but not resolved in two early Supreme Court
cases. In American Medical Association v. United States35 the
Justice Department charged the AMA and a local medical society
with conspiring to obstruct the operation of a prepaid medical
plan. The interstate commerce defense was inapplicable since the
alleged activity took place in the District of Columbia and there-
fore could be challenged under section 3 of the Sherman Act,36
which was not limited by commerce clause restrictions. The Su-
preme Court, in considering the "trade or commerce" defense, nar-
rowed its application by focusing on whether the object of the re-
straint was engaged in commerce, instead of examining the
occupation of the defendants. While this interpretation resulted in
affirmance of the circuit court's finding of liability, it also enabled
the Court to sidestep the question of whether a profession is a
"trade" under the antitrust laws. 7
Nine years after the AMA decision, the Supreme Court was
faced with similar allegations of a physician boycott of prepaid
group practices in United States v. Oregon State Medical Soci-
ety." This time the Court upheld the trial court's conclusions that
illegal behavior that may have occurred prior to 1941 did not jus-
tify an injunction in 1949 and that no other antitrust violations'
32. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
33. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); FTC v. Rala-
dam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
34. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hosp. Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959); Rigall v.
Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957).
35. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
36. "Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of
Columbia ... is declared illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
37. The Court stated, "Much argument has been addressed to the question whether a
physician's practice of his profession constitutes trade under § 3 of the Sherman Act. In the
light of what we shall say with respect to the charge laid in the indictment, we need not
consider or decide this question." 317 U.S. at 528.
38. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
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had been proved. 9 While not expressly ruling on whether an ex-
ception existed for the "learned professions," the Court observed
in passing that ethical considerations inhere in the doctor-patient
relationship and that, therefore, usual forms of business competi-
tion could be "demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profes-
sion."'40 In addition, the Court affirmed the lower court ruling that
the sale of medical services by physician sponsored organizations
did not have sufficient impact on interstate commerce to justify
Sherman Act jurisdiction. Even though this holding could be con-
strued narrowly,41 when coupled with general pronouncements on
the special nature of the professionals, the case presented a sub-
stantial setback to antitrust enforcement efforts in the professional
context.
For the next twenty years, the Supreme Court did not have to
face the question of an antitrust exemption for the learned profes-
sions. When the issue arose again in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,'2 however, the Court unanimously rejected the claims made
for a broad professional defense. At issue in Goldfarb was the le-
gality of a minimum fee schedule for real estate closings estab-
lished by a local bar association. After determining that the prac-
tice constituted price-fixing, the Court concluded that Congress
intended the antitrust laws to be applied broadly: "The nature of
an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act . . .nor is the public-service aspect of professional
practice controlling in determining whether § 1 [of the Sherman
Act] includes professions.'
The Court also found that the financial arrangements neces-
sary to conduct the real estate transactions had a sufficient effect
on commerce to sustain Sherman Act jurisdiction. This holding
39. Some commentators have suggested that the government lost the case because it
failed to pursue adequately allegations that the Medical Society's efforts to form its own
prepaid plan were predatory tactics designed to inhibit the growth of the for-profit prepaid
plans. See Goldberg & Greenberg, The Effect of Physician-Controlled Health Insurance, 2
J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L. 48 (1977); Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in
Health Care Financing, 1978 DuKE L.J. 303, 314-16.
40. 343 U.S. at 336.
41. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision under the "clearly errone-
ous" rule, noting that "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm con-
viction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 339 (quoting United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). See Bauer, Professional Activities and the
Antitrust Laws, 50 NoTR DAME LAW. 570, 596 (1975).
42. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
43. Id. at 787 (citations omitted).
934 [Vol. 34:927
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was consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions narrowing the
"interstate commerce" defense in a variety of contexts.4 4 The de-
fense now is unavailable to many institutional defendants and in
some cases has been denied to individual practitioners acting in a
single state."
Goldfarb thus made it clear that professionals do not enjoy a
broad antitrust exemption. In its now famous footnote seventeen,4"
however, the Court left the door open for special treatment of pro-
fessionals in cases involving restraints that fall short of classic
price-fixing. In considering just how the professions might be
treated differently, two issues seemed particularly relevant to the
Court: (1) what are the goals of antitrust (and relatedly what fac-
tors would merit consideration as possible counterweights to an-
ticompetitive activity), and (2) how should courts go about deter-
mining the legality of alleged anticompetitive activity? Both of
these questions have received substantial attention by courts and
scholars reviewing the application of antitrust principles to typical
commercial contexts. A brief digression on these questions may be
helpful, therefore, to set the stage for National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States,47 the second Supreme Court de-
cision considering antitrust and the "learned professions."
The brevity of the federal antitrust statutes, along with the
absence of any clear, single congressional intent leading up to the
passage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts," have left to the courts
the responsibility for pinpointing antitrust goals and developing a
framework on how to analyze antitrust violations. These issues re-
44. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976) (small
proprietary hospital has requisite commerce effect through its purchase of out-of-state sup-
plies, insurance, management consultation, and financing).
45. Id. See also Zamiri v. William Beaumont Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (loss of Medicare and Medicaid funds supplied requisite interstate effect). See Bor-
sody, supra note 22, at 423-29 (1979).
46. The Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is,
of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sher-
man Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable
with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features
of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be
viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We
intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted
today.
421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
47. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
48. See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTrrauST POLICY (1955).
1981] 935
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main far from resolved. The debate on antitrust goals has centered
in recent years on whether the sole end of antitrust enforcement is
economic efficiency. The alternative view is that other goals involv-
ing equity concerns, such as dispersion of economic power, the pro-
tection of small business, the preservation of equal opportunity,
and the promotion of fairness, must also be considered.4' Related
to this issue is the question of how to weigh the social gains result-
ing from a restriction against its anticompetitive harms. Although
the predominant view has been to limit antitrust analysis to an-
ticompetitive impact, defendants have persistently sought to jus-
tify their conduct by suggesting that in their particular situation,
competition was harmful to the public interest.50 Proponents of
this position have found support in two early Supreme Court
cases51 that seem to validate activities that were detrimental to
competition. 2
In addition to providing little guidance on the goals of anti-
trust, the basic statutes are also silent on how courts should pro-
ceed in determining whether restraints are in fact illegal. The
Sherman Act literally bans all "restraint[s] of trade." Because
every commercial agreement or contract restrains trade to some
extent, a distinction had to be drawn between reasonable restraints
and undue restrictions.58 Gradually, after gaining experience with a
number of restraints in different commercial contexts, the courts
have developed two approaches to analyzing restraints. Concerted
action generally is analyzed under the Rule of Reason," to deter-
mine whether the purpose and effect of arrangements is to harm
competition significantly. This inquiry, however, tends to be pro-
tracted and expensive and provides little guidance concerning the
49. For consideration of these questions, see Bork & Bowman, The Goals of Antitrust:
A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A
Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 1182 (1977).
50. See L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST § 66 (1977).
51. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
52. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
53. See generally id.
54. The "Rule of Reason" under the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy that unreasonably and significantly restrains competition. Whether the
particular restraint unduly suppresses competition depends on "the facts peculiar to the
business in which the restraint is applied, the [nature and] history of the restraint, its prob-
able impact, and the reasons why it was imposed." National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
[Vol. 34:927
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legality of various activities. Thus, a second type of analysis is ap-
plied to certain classes of restraints that experience indicates will
have anticompetitive effects in the overwhelming number of cases.
Once a restraint is found to fall in such a class, it is declared per se
illegal and inquiry is not required to determine the actual purpose
and effect of the arrangement.'5
The Supreme Court has concluded that per se treatment is ap-
propriate for such categories of restraints as horizontal price-
fixing," group boycotts, 57 market divisions," and tying arrange-
ments.' Neither the courts nor commentators, however, have ar-
rived at a clear consensus about what other types of arrangements
deserve per se treatment. Because of its overwhelming importance
in determining the burden that plaintiffs must bear in antitrust
litigation, the classification of restraints in either the per se or Rule
of Reason category has been the focus of much of the controversy
concerning the appropriate scope of the antitrust laws.60
With this background in mind, the contribution of Profes-
sional Engineers to the debate can be better appreciated. The case
clarified antitrust goals and pointed the way toward how courts
should proceed in analyzing restraints in the professional context.
In Professional Engineers the Supreme Court examined a section
of the canon of ethics of the National Society of Professional Engi-
neers that prohibited members from submitting competitive bids
for engineering services. The society attempted to justify the canon
55. The Supreme Court recently discussed the rationale for per se treatment-
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social
utility of particular commercial practices. The probability that anticompetitive conse-
quences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be
balanced against its pro-competitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generaliza-
tion may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not suffi-
ciently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify
them. Once established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business commu-
nity and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the more com-
plex rule-of-reason trials ....
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
56. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
57. Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
58. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
59. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
60. As Sullivan points out, however, the consequences of this classification would be
greatly reduced were courts to limit themselves strictly to procompetitive justifications in
Rule of Reason cases. L. SuLLIvAN, supra note 50, at § 72. As indicated below, Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), suggests that a continuum
approach be employed in which the analyses required under the two standards begin to
converge. See text accompanying notes 94-98 infra.
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on the grounds that it minimized the risk that competition would
produce inferior engineering work and thereby endanger public
health and safety. In rejecting this justification, the Court substan-
tially clarified its views on the purpose of antitrust law. In the
Court's opinion, the goal of the Sherman Act is to further competi-
tion; therefore, the sole purpose of judicial analysis "is to form a
judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint...
not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public
interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry."6 1 Mak-
ing exceptions to the Act whenever public safety rationales were
offered, the Court said, "would be tantamount to a repeal of the
statute."62
Despite the Court's conclusions, the Professional Engineers
opinion unfortunately failed to provide explicit guidance about
how courts should analyze restraints by professionals. The Court
did acknowledge the "cautionary footnote" in Goldfarb, stating
that it still adhered to the view that "by their nature, professional
services may differ significantly from other business services, and,
accordingly, the nature of the competition in such services may
vary."63 The Court, however, offered little counsel about whether,
and what kind of, special consideration should be given to profes-
sional services. The opinion itself is unclear as to whether a per se
or Rule of Reason approach was applied in reviewing the engi-
neers' canon.
64
Even with these shortcomings, however, Professional Engi-
neers does provide very significant insights in considering arrange-
ments by professional groups. In particular, as will be discussed
below,65 the Court's emphasis on competitive impact as the touch-
stone for determining legality under the antitrust laws points the
61. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
62. Id. at 695.
63. Id. at 696 (citing with approval Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-
89 n.17 (1975)).
64. Throughout the Professional Engineers opinion the Court implied that it was un-
dertaking a Rule of Reason inquiry; but it then condemned the ethical canon as a trade
restraint "on its face," thereby suggesting per se illegality. This ambiguity has created con-
fusion among commentators. Compare Havighurst, supra note 39, at 348 n.194 and Kissam,
Antitrust Law, the First Amendment, and Professional Self-Regulation of Technical Qual-
ity in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 143 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980) with Sullivan &
Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding
Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 265, 323 (1979) and Note,
Prepaid Prescription Drug Plans Under Antitrust Scrutiny: A Stern Challenge to Health
Care Cost Containment, 75 Nw. U.L. Rav. 506, 511 n.29 (1980).
65. See text accompanying notes 92-128 infra.
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way to constructing a coherent framework for analyzing profes-
sional restraints. Before considering that framework, however, it is
useful to consider some of the difficulties encountered in previous
attempts to apply antitrust concepts in the professional context.
IV. KEY ISSUES IN CONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST
LAW TO HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
A. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society: An
Unsatisfactory Resolution to Some Difficult Questions
Illustrative of the need for guidance in applying antitrust law
to arrangements by health professionals is the recent Ninth Circuit
decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society.66 Declar-
ing that it was "uncertain about the competitive order that should
exist within the health care industry,"67 the Ninth Circuit held
that an agreement by physicians to fix maximum prices, which
would be classifed per se illegal in most situations, was to be judg-
ed by the Rule of Reason. The justification for providing such a
broad exception to per se analysis was poorly reasoned and articu-
lated. Moreover, the opinion provided little guidance concerning
how courts using the Rule of Reason should assess a whole range of
practices that their experience in other contexts has taught them
have so few "redeeming virtues" that they are considered per se
illegal.
In Maricopa the court was concerned with the conduct of two
"foundations for medical care" (FMCs) and the county medical so-
ciety associated with them. FMCs are a new method for financing
health care that has been adopted by some medical societies in re-
cent years.6 8 They resemble Blue Shield plans, in that services are
prepaid, but FMCs include strong "peer review" mechanisms in an
attempt to control costs more effectively. At issue in Maricopa was
the FMCs' practice of polling their members from time to time to
set upper limits on fees charged to patients and covered by insur-
ance plans approved by the FMCs. The State of Arizona charged
that this practice constituted price-fixing and, therefore, was a per
se violation of the antitrust laws. The district court, after noting
the recent trend away from per se characterization and the hints
in Goldfarb and Professional Engineers that the professions may
66. [1980-1] Trade Cas. 63,239 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S.
March 9, 1981) (No. 80-419).
67. Id. at 78,154.
68. See Egdahl, Foundations for Medical Care, 288 N. ENG. J. MED. 491-98 (1973).
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warrant special treatment, held that the Rule of Reason approach
was required. 9 It therefore denied the plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability, because insufficient ev-
idence had been submitted regarding the purpose and effect of the
practices and the market power of the defendants.
In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
ruling. Observing that it was generally unfamiliar with competition
in the health care industry, the court declared that the proper in-
quiry was simply whether prices would have been lower but for the
practices of the FMCs.7 0 To prove this price effect, the state would
have to show that the FMCs engaged in predatory pricing in an
attempt to discourage entry, a scenario the court felt was based on
a theory too controversial and evidence too scanty to justify a per
se ban. 1
By basing its refusal to apply per se standards on the unusual
nature of the health care industry, the court in Maricopa may have
created a special exemption from traditional antitrust analysis for
physicians and other medical providers. Some practices, which
elsewhere lack any redeeming virtues, may have substantial
procompetitive effects that outweigh their anticompetitive aspects
in the health care context. The court's decision, however, provides
little guidance in selecting those practices; instead, it suggests that
the entire profession might deserve an exemption since its compet-
itive climate is unlike that of most other industries. This result is
ironic, for these "conditions" are, to a large extent, the result of
efforts by health care providers themselves to stifle competition.72
Even more important, the Ninth Circuit's requirement that
the plaintiffs show that the FMCs practice would raise prices is
misplaced. While price increases might indeed result from the de-
fendant's conduct, the crucial issue is the overall effect on competi-
tion. Whatever possible benefits may result from maximum fee-
setting, it is hard to refute that the practice is a restraint on com-
petition: it consists of denying individual buyers and sellers the
69. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, [1979-1] Trade Cas. 62,694 (D. Ariz.
1979), aff'd, [1980-1] Trade Cas. 63,239 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3663
(U.S. March 9, 1981) (No. 80-419).
70. [1980-1] Trade Cas. 1 63,239, at 78,155.
71. Judge Kennedy concurred on the grounds that the court lacked experience with
the health care industry and therefore required a Rule of Reason examination of the FMCs'
practices. He hinted, however, that the trial might very well show that the practices did not
have an anticompetitive effect. Id. at 78,157-58.
72. See Havighurst, supra note 4, at 97; Palmer, Antitrust Activities by the FTC in
the Health Field, 37 FED. B.J. 40, 42 (1978).
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freedom to determine their own prices."3 In the context of a pre-
paid health plan, however, such an arrangement may be necessary
to control expenditures and maintain competitive prices for the
overall plan. The relevant inquiry, therefore, should be whether
the defendant has shown sufficient possible procompetitive effects
of its restraints that the overall impact will not be detrimental to
competition. By failing to focus its attention on this question, the
Ninth Circuit's approach enables health professionals, by simply
pointing to their industry's special characteristics, to negate the
extensive experience courts have accumulated with regard to a
whole gamut of competitive restraints. A better developed analyti-
cal framework is needed-one that allows courts to consider the
exceptional characteristics of the health care industry without re-
quiring that they discard well-developed analytic tools that facili-
tate certainty and efficiency in judicial decisionmaking.
B. Drawbacks to Some of the Existing Approaches to
Professional Restraints
Courts and commentators have suggested various ways to ana-
lyze the legality of professional restraints. Unfortunately, these
proposals tend to be either too broad-i.e., they consider factors
unrelated to competitive impact-or too narrow-i.e., they focus
exclusively on the noncommercial aspects of certain professional
conduct without regard to the unique economic factors that may
come into play with purely commercial restraints in the health sec-
tor. The commercial/noncommercial distinction is not useful in the
health care market, however, because the fact that conduct is
purely commercial does not necessarily mean that it is not also
procompetitive.
The first attempts to create a new analytical framework were
made soon after Goldfarb laid to rest any doubts that the antitrust
laws applied to the professions. Seizing upon the Supreme Court's
acknowledgment that the public service aspects of the profession
might warrant a special approach, 4 several commentators pro-
posed that the courts should apply an expanded Rule of Reason
approach balancing the anticompetitive aspects of a given restraint
73. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (Agreements
to fix maximum resale prices, "no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom
of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judg-
ment."); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 50, at § 78 (1977).
74. See note 46 supra.
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against its direct benefit to the public.7 5 These commentators sug-
gested that courts should consider heavily such factors as the ex-
tent to which a good faith intention to carry out professional re-
sponsibilities motivated a restraint and whether the restraint was
unnecessarily restrictive.
This broad weighing of anticompetitive effects against public
benefits was adopted tentatively by the Ninth Circuit in Boddicker
v. Arizona State Dental Association.78 An agreement tying mem-
bership in a national dental association to membership in a local
association was at issue. The court held that for this practice to
survive a Sherman Act challenge, it "must serve the purpose for
which the profession exists, viz. to serve the public .... Those
[practices] which only suppress competition between practitioners
will fail to survive the challenge. This interpretation permits a har-




Defendants for many years have advocated such a "harmoni-
zation" process whereby courts would consider the public interest
justifications of their restraints when assessing alleged antitrust vi-
olations. While there are cases that suggest that such a broad Rule
of Reason approach should be adopted, the prevailing trend has
been to limit the inquiry to the effect of the restraint on competi-
tion.7 8 Allowing other factors to be considered would require courts
to make value judgments for which they are ill-equipped and that
traditionally have been reserved to the legislature.79 Moreover, the
Supreme Court's decision in Professional Engineers"0 dispelled
any thoughts that the professions warranted the more expansive
approach. The Court made it clear that its sole concern under the
antitrust laws was the effect of a restraint on competition and not
75. See, e.g., Note, The Antitrust Liability of Professional Associations After Gold-
farb: Reformulating the Learned Professions Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 DuKE
L.J. 1047, 1068; Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by
Physicians, 30 RUTGmS L. REV. 991, 1020-21 (1977). See also Bauer, supra note 41, at 585.
76. 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). See also Paralegal Inst.,
Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1123, 1130, (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying the princi-
ples enunciated in Boddicker to find that ABA guidelines for accreditation of paralegal
schools were reasonable under the Sherman Act).
77. 549 F.2d at 632. The court cautioned, however, that this interpretation was only a
"principle to be employed in deciding specific cases" and not a blueprint that would resolve
all controversies. The latter would require additional guidance from the Supreme Court and
other cases. Id.
78. See L. SuLLivAN, supra note 50, at § 66.
79. See Bork, supra note 52, at 838-39 (1965).
80. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
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whether competition itself was in the public interest or in the in-
terest of the members of the industry.8 1 The latter questions were
policy decisions to be made solely by Congress.2
An alternative to the expansive Rule of Reason approach for
all professional restraints involves a two-step analysis in which a
court would first decide whether conduct has a sufficient noncom-
mercial purpose to remove it from per se treatment; if such a pur-
pose is found, then a Rule of Reason analysis would be pursued.83
One commentator has suggested that conduct pass a three-pronged
test in the first step of the analysis in order to avoid a finding of
per se illegality: the conduct (1) must arguably fall within the legit-
imate self-regulating powers of the profession, (2) must not serve a
predominantly profit-oriented or commercial purpose, and (3)
must be undertaken in good faith-meaning that it meets an ob-
jective test focusing on a reasonable person in the position of the
professional defendant and examines the timing and sequence of
events leading up to and following the imposition of the restraint."
Making a determination based on a commercial/noncommer-
cial distinction, however, causes several problems. Certain re-
straints that elsewhere would be considered per se illegal may, in
81. But see Note, Antitrust-Rule of Reason, 57 J. URB. L. 142, 162 (1979), suggesting
that despite the Professional Engineers holding, a liberal weighing of social and political
values is both desirable and inevitable.
82. 435 U.S. at 689-92. The state legislatures, through the state action doctrine, can
also make certain actions exempt from the antitrust laws. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943).
83. The most explicit judicial statement of this approach is found in Veizaga v. Na-
tional Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, [1977-1] Trade Cas. 1 61,274 (N.D. Ill. 1977):
Where professional organizations are alleged to have committed a per se offense, a two-
step analysis is required. First, the court must determine whether the challenged activ-
ity is, by its nature and character, commercial. If the court should find that it is com-
mercial, the professional organization may be liable for a per se offense. However, if the
court should find the activity to be noncommercial, it should then apply a rule of rea-
son analysis, using the factors outlined in Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231 (1917). We believe that the second step is necessary to ensure that those profes-
sional activities, while noncommercial in their character, but unreasonable (in the anti-
trust sense) in their impact, are subject to the antitrust laws. This analysis satisfies the
concern of the court that professions should be subject to the antitrust laws but still be
treated differently where the public service aspects of the professions are involved.
Id. at 70,870.
84. Note, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se
Rules Under the Sherman Act, 11 J. L. RF. 387, 399-400 (1978). For an example of a
refusal by a court to invoke a Rule of Reason approach for an otherwise per se illegal boy-
cott because it was not satisfied that these three criteria had been met, see Feminist Wo-
men's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 924 (1979).
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the health care context, have procompetitive effects.8 5 When a
commercial purpose is conceded, however, under the above ap-
proach defendant's conduct will be per se illegal no matter what its
beneficial effects. In addition to being too narrow in this respect,
the test is also too broad in others. According to Professional En-
gineers, the only issue under either the per se or Rule of Reason
analysis is the effect of a restraint on competition." The three-
pronged examination is therefore unnecessary and irrelevant, be-
cause it is not directed to the ultimate issue to be decided. A re-
straint on competition-even if it is an exercise of legitimate self-
regulatory powers, in pursuit of a noncommercial purpose, and un-
dertaken in good faith-is nevertheless illegal if its anticompetitive
aspects are not balanced by procompetitive effects. 87 It is inappo-
site to use only those three critieria to exempt traditionally an-
ticompetitive conduct from a per se ban, for they shed no direct
light on the crucial question under consideration: the impact of the
practice on competition. Moreover, the distinction between a com-
mercial and noncommercial purpose is often a difficult, if not im-
possible one to draw. Noncommercial reasons can easily be ad-
vanced to justify most restraints. In many cases, conduct may have
both commercial and noncommercial motives.8 8 While inquiry into
purpose may shed some light on a restraint's intended effect, plac-
ing central importance on this distinction would entangle courts in
difficult assessments about a host of arguably noncommercial ratio-
nales that are only tangentially related to the conduct's net impact
on competition.
The approaches examined in this section are not without their
merits. Such considerations as noncommercial purpose, good faith,
85. See text accompanying notes 152-54 infra.
86. 435 U.S. at 692.
87. The proponent of the three-pronged approach suggests that the test for whether a
given professional activity is legitimate self-regulation is whether "the conduct is germane to
the purposes of the profession's self-regulatory mandate." Note, supra note 84, at 401. To
the extent that a restraint is clearly an articulated state policy and actively supervised by
the state, it may be exempt from antitrust sanctions. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (dictum); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943). The exemption is the result of the state action doctrine, however, and is not the
product of special treatment afforded to self-regulating professionals. Under Professional
Engineers, ethical norms designed to regulate competition or marketing restraints relating
to product safety still must have at most an insubstantial net anticompetitive effect. See
National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 n.22 (1978); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of
Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 638 n.18 (D.D.C. 1979).
88. See Havighurst, supra note 39, at 353 n.214.
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and the absence of less restrictive alternatives do provide some
help in determining whether certain conduct violates the antitrust
laws.8 9 These factors should be considered, however, not in terms
of creating special exemptions from antitrust scrutiny for certain
professional restraints, but rather as bearing on the extent of the
procompetitive justifications that may balance the anticompetitive
effects of the conduct in question. The crucial inquiries therefore
are: (1) how might practices, elsewhere per se illegal, be procompe-
titive when undertaken in the professional context, and (2) how
should courts go about assessing such procompetitive justifica-
tions? As the next section will demonstrate, much experience al-
ready has been gained in wrestling with related questions, and the
outline to their answers is apparent in existing case law.
C. Between Per Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Judicial
Experience with an Intermediate Level Scrutiny of Restraints
Since Goldfarb was decided in 1975, the courts have been
faced with the task of assessing the legality under the antitrust
laws of many professional practices with which they have had little
experience. Activities of engineers, lawyers, doctors, dentists, real-
tors, architects, pharmacists, and many others have for the first
time been examined for their possible anticompetitive impact.90
Lacking the considerable experience with these business relation-
ships that the Supreme Court has suggested is necessary before per
se standards may be applied,91 courts have been reluctant to adopt
wholesale characterizations developed in other commercial con-
texts. As the preceding discussion has indicated, however, Profes-
sional Engineers has limited the scope of inquiry under the Rule
of Reason to competitive impact.9 2 The result of these develop-
89. See L. SurLiVAN, supra note 50, at §§ 70-72, 74.
90. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978);
Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-930); Feminist Women's Health
Center, Inc. v. Mohammand, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979);
Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977); Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 484 F. Supp.
1195 (D.D.C. 1980); Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1979); United
States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
91. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972). See Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1977); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
92. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
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ments is that while more practices are likely to be analyzed under
the Rule of Reason, that analysis in the professional context need
not consider justifications unrelated to competitive impact. This
narrower focus on competition suggests a solution to the poten-
tially unmanageable burdens of extended judicial examination of
professional conduct. An intermediate level of scrutiny between
traditional per se and Rule of Reason analysis can be used to de-
termine the likelihood that restraints will have a net procompeti-
tive impact. Such an examination would permit courts to gain ex-
perience with new business practices, but could be carried out in a
straightforward manner without the need for extended economic
analysis.93
While such middle level scrutiny has not been explicitly recog-
nized by the courts, the reality is that courts do apply this type of
analysis when they determine whether certain restraints should be
characterized as per se violations. Often a case involves conduct
that does not constitute a classic "naked" restraint of trade; in-
stead, the defendant has argued that the arrangement's impact on
competition is only incidental to improved production efficiencies
or improved market functioning, and that, therefore, the arrange-
ment in fact enhances competition.9 If such conduct were charac-
terized as a per se horizontal restraint, like price-fixing, market
division, or group boycott, all further inquiry into these possible
procompetitive justifications would be cut off. Consequently,
courts have traditionally conducted a truncated analysis that
examines the procompetitive justifications and possible anticompe-
titive results. If satisfied that significant beneficial results may ex-
ist, the court will not declare the restraint illegal under the per se
ban, but will instead apply the more extensive Rule of Reason
scrutiny.
This characterization process was evident in the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.9 5 The question was whether the issu-
ance of blanket licenses for copyrighted music constituted an ille-
gal price-fixing arrangement. The Court noted that, while in a lit-
eral sense composers and publishing houses had joined together to
set prices, it was not always "a simple matter" to determine
whether such conduct deserved the label of per se price-fixing.' 6 To
93. See Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 64, at 323-24, 332-35.
94. L. SuLLmvm, supra note 50, at § 74.
95. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
96. Id. at 9.
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determine how to characterize the practice, the Court said it would
be necessary to
focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to show effect ... the
purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our predomi-
nantly free-market economy-that is, whether the practice facially appears
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output, and in what portion of the market, or instead one designed





That this examination required some intermediate level of analysis
was clear from the Court's observation that "[tihe scrutiny oc-
casionally required must not merely subsume the burdensome
analysis required under the rule of reason [citing Professional En-
gineers], or else we should apply the rule of reason from the
start."98
Three situations have been recognized in which this more ex-
tensive inquiry is required before a restraint may be characterized
as either "per se" or "Rule of Reason" conduct. All three situations
involve cases in which the particular circumstances of the market
have enabled the defendants, charged with a per se violation, to
justify their actions as procompetitive. These exceptions merit at-
tention because they suggest that existing antitrust doctrine is suf-
ficiently flexible to cope with legitimate professional activity. They
are:
(1) Joint action to make or expand a market. In certain situa-
tions competitors may agree on practices that affect price forma-
tion or divide markets in order that an organized market can be
widened and run more efficiently. The leading case is Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States99 in which the Supreme Court
upheld an arrangement among grain traders that, by fixing night
prices at the level of the closing bid of the prior day session, had
the effect of channelling all nighttime transactions into the more
organized daytime exchange. Of a similar nature are cases dealing
with tobacco auction markets in which the time of sales was regu-
lated to enable buyers to attend all auctions sequentially.100 An-
other way in which joint action may expand a market is through
standardization, thereby bringing together elements of supply and
demand that previously did not participate in the same market.
97. Id. at 19-20 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 19 n.33.
99. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
100. See L. SuLLrvAN, supra note 50, at § 76 and cases cited therein.
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For example, if thirty firms each manufactured nuts and bolts of
different sizes, each company might be dealing with only its own
subgroup of buyers. Standardization of the product could bring all
of the buyers and sellers together in the same market and thereby
enhance competition. 101
(2) Joint action to improve market functioning. Certain fac-
tors, such as high transaction and information costs, uncertainty,
and substantial externalities, can cause a market to function
poorly.10 2 In such a situation, certain joint activities that are not
overly restrictive may be undertaken by competitiors in order to
improve market functioning. Standardization again provides an ex-
ample: if an industry adopts uniform requirements for products,
warranties, service, and other nonprice terms, buyers may be bet-
ter able to make comparisons, thereby stimulating price competi-
tion.103 Certification programs similarly may have procompetitive
effects by providing consumers with otherwise difficult-to-obtain
information about products or services.
The extent to which competitors can take such self-regulatory
action to correct possible market failures is unclear. No matter
how laudable their justification, activities that openly involve boy-
cotts as a sanction against nonconforming competitors are prob-
ably still per se illegal absent explicit congressional or state author-
ization for such self-regulation.
1 0 4
Self-regulation that does not take the form of an explicit boy-
cott, but that may have similar effects, requires substantial analy-
sis before it can be characterized to avoid per se labelling. The
court will consider such factors as (a) the possibility that the self-
101. This example is suggested by Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 64, at 323-24.
102. See C. SCHULTZE, supra note 21, at 32-43.
103. Of course in an oligopolistic market, standardization of nonprice terms may facili-
tate collusion and, therefore, have anticompetitive effects. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MAR-
KrET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 200-04 (2d ed. 1980); L. SULLIVAN, supra note
50, at §§ 99-100. Thus, each particular situation requires analysis, and no simple rule of
legality or illegality can be drawn.
104. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). The
Supreme Court in Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), declared that a
boycott could escape per se condemnation only if the justification stems from a legislative
mandate "or otherwise." Id. at 348-49. The commentators have disagreed on whether that
phrase might allow for self-regulation in cases in which there is no government declaration
but the structure of the industry requires such collective action. Compare L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 50, at § 88 with Note, supra note 84, at 400. See also Note, Trade Association
Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1486, 1499 (1966). If the collective action is truly essential for the industry to function, it is
probably better considered under the ancillary restraint doctrine. See text accompanying
notes 106-110 infra; R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADox 342-44 (1978).
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policing justification might actually be a sham, (b) whether the
standards are objective and reasonable, (c) the extent to which the
goals of the program advance consumer interests and are socially
useful, and (d) whether the enforcement mechanisms are procedur-
ally fair. o10 Collective action that satisfies these criteria is consid-
ered to have sufficient procompetitive effects to warrant more com-
plete analysis under the Rule of Reason.
(3) Joint action to achieve integrated efficiencies. Concerted
action may also escape per se treatment if it leads to efficiencies
that can be directly traced to the integration of activities by the
participating firms. This exception, known as the "ancillary re-
straint doctrine," was first enunciated in United States v. Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co.10 Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft, relying on
common law precedents, declared that covenants in restraint of
trade may be legal if they are "merely ancillary" to the main pur-
pose of a lawful contract, necessary to protect the convenantee,
and reasonably adapted and limited to that protection.10 7
It should be emphasized that the arrangements to which the
ancillary restraint doctrine applies are those in which efficiencies
result from a partial integration of functions. They are thus distin-
guished, on the one hand, from loose agreements like cartels, which
have little potential for producing efficiencies, and, on the other
hand, from complete integrations, like mergers, which are not
treated as "naked" restraints of trade but are instead evaluated
under the Rule of Reason or under the antimerger provisions of
section 7 of the Clayton Act.10 8 Typical partial integration arrange-
ments that may be treated as ancillary include joint selling, buy-
ing, advertising, or research activities. As in the other exceptions to
per se analysis, the touchstone is still the ultimate effect of the
conduct on competition. Ancillary restraints are tolerated because
they may increase efficiency and thereby enhance competition. 09
105. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 50, at § 88.
106. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
107. 85 F. at 282-83. As examples of such ancillary restraints Taft suggested agree-
ments by a seller of a business or property not to compete with the buyer or by a partner
not to do anything to interfere with the business of the partnership. See Bork, supra note
52, at 796-801.
108. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 50, at § 77.
109. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20
(1979). (In characterizing conduct under the per se rule, inquiry is whether restraint is
designed to "increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, com-
petitive") (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16
(1978)). But see Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engi-
neers Decisions, 67 GEo. L.J. 1187, 1192 (1979), in which the author suggests that the status
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Thus, conduct that involves integration efficiency nevertheless will
be condemned as per se illegal if, after a truncated analysis, the
court concludes that the participants possess such significant mar-
ket power that the arrangement's effect likely will be to dampen
competition.1
As discussed above, 11 the courts traditionally have considered
the three exceptions to per se analysis when deciding whether re-
straints should be characterized as falling within the per se cate-
gory. The extent of this consideration falls somewhere between the
review given to "naked" per se restraints and full-blown Rule of
Reason treatment. It matters little whether the process is called an
"expanded per se approach" or a "circumscribed Rule of Reason"
examination, as long as it is recognized that an intermediate level
of analysis is being employed. As will be developed below, this
traditional approach supplies a sufficiently flexible framework to
enable courts to analyze restraints by health professionals. 1"
While the characterization process technically has been only
the first step in deciding how an antitrust analysis should proceed,
from a practical standpoint it often has been conclusive. If conduct
is characterized as a "naked restraint," by definition it is per se
illegal, and the inquiry ends. Conduct that escapes such characteri-
zation conceivably could be declared illegal under the Rule of Rea-
son. In practice, however, the burden of showing anticompetitive
purpose and effect is so great that restraints that have passed mus-
ter under the characterization stage are rarely found illegal under a
later full Rule of Reason analysis.111 Thus, the factors used in this
examination and the weight they are accorded deserve special at-
tention. It is to these questions that the discussion now turns.
of a pure efficiency defense involving no procompetitive benefits is still unresolved by Pro-
fessional Engineers.
110. L. SULLiVAN, supra note 50, at § 77.
111. See notes 99-109 supra and accompanying text.
112. Indeed, the Supreme Court decisions in both Goldfarb and Professional Engi-
neers can be seen as employing this middle-level analysis, which has created some confusion
among commentators who have sought to classify the results as either per se or Rule of
Reason decisions. See Note, supra note 75, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1047, 1051 n.23 (discussing con-
flicting view of Goldfarb). See also note 64 supra.
113. In many cases a court, after characterizing a restraint as one that does not war-
rant per se treatment, will proceed without much further analysis also to hold it lawful
under the Rule of Reason. See, e.g., Hatley v. American Quarter Horse As'n, 552 F.2d 646
(5th Cir. 1977); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467
F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); United States v. American Soc'y
of Anesthesiologists, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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D. A Framework for Analyzing Restraints by Professionals
As the Supreme Court observed in Goldfarb, "It would be un-
realistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with
other business activities, and automatically to apply to the profes-
sions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas."11 On the
other hand, this recognition does not require that judicial experi-
ence derived from ninety years of antitrust enforcement be jet-
tisoned wholesale. Removing restraints from a per se ban entails
substantial losses in judicial economy, certainty, and deterrence.115
There are few guidelines concerning how a Rule of Reason inquiry
should be conducted. As one commentator has noted, "The rule
has been throughout most of its history more a euphemism for
nonliability than an administrable test of legality."11 6 Thus, there
is a need for an intermediate level analysis and a framework that
can serve to guide courts in considering conduct by professionals.
As the preceding section has indicated, the outline of such a frame-
work can be found in antitrust precedents involving the "charac-
terization" of restraints that have possible procompetitive
justifications.
The touchstone for legality under the antitrust law must be
the effect of conduct on competition.1 7 Acts by professionals de-
serve exceptional treatment only to the extent that their competi-
tive impact differs from the results that would be expected from
similar practices in commercial contexts with which the courts are
more familiar. When professionals engage in activities that in other
settings have so few redeeming virtues that they are considered per
114. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975).
115. As one commentator has noted,
A [Rule of Reason] standard under which all circumstances are weighed, and violations
found only upon demonstration of specific anticompetitive effects, may sound sober
and moderate, but in the real world has little deterrent effect, produces trials and iWor-
dinate length and expense, and often undermines antitrust enforcement. Business prac-
tices tested under a full rule of reason, with no presumptions based on any set of facts
and with the burden of showing anticompetitive effect on the plaintiff, will usually turn
out to be legal.
Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-price Vertical Restrictions, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2 (1978).
116. Posner, supra note 109, at 1191 n.33.
117. "Competition" may have several definitions and has been used by courts and
commentators to mean different things. See R. BORK, supra note 104, at 56-61. Perhaps the
best approach to clarifying what is meant by "increasing competition" is to use that term to
refer to efforts which facilitate output expansion; therefore the goal of antitrust is to design
rules that bar output restriction. See Elzinga, The Compass of Competition for Professional
Services, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 64, at 109-10.
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se illegal, their conduct should likewise be presumed unlawful. In
contrast to the inference that is created when the conduct occurs
in typical business circumstances, however, this presumption
should be rebuttable. It can be overcome by a showing that, in the
particular context, the practices have substantial procompetitive
effects that may balance out any anticompetitive impact.118
Three ways in which restraints may enhance competition have
been suggested: conduct can create or expand markets, improve
market functioning, or provide efficiencies as a result of a partial
integration. While there may be additional ways in which restric-
tions can have procompetitive effects, the courts have so far recog-
nized only these mechanisms. " 9 It is essential that any attempt to
expand this list of justifications be tied strictly to the touchstone
of competitive effect and not be muddled by acceptance of other
allegedly beneficial rationales.
In weighing the plausibility of a defendant's procompetitive
justifications, a court can look for guidance to cases from the com-
mercial context in which exceptions have been made to traditional
per se treatment.1 0 The extent to which a practice resembles a
"naked trade restraint" certainly should be an important factor.
Thus, for example, conduct that effectively fixes minimum prices
will carry a much stronger presumption of illegality than will re-
strictions tending to limit the manner in which professionals can
practice. In considering whether a restraint is likely to enhance
competition, courts also should consider the following factors:
(1) Motivation and Purpose of the Arrangement. The ulti-
mate concern of the court is, of course, the effect of a particular
restraint. Nevertheless, an inquiry into the defendants' intentions
in pursuing their conduct may shed light on its probable impact.
12 1
118. The use of rebuttable presumptions to facilitate trials of trade restraints that
may not merit per se treatment has been suggested by several commentators. See Bohling,
A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic
Analysis and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REv. 461, 510-18 (1979); Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guidepoints to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139,
1158-81 (1952); Note, A Suggested Role for Rebuttable Presumptions in Antitrust Re-
straint Trade Litigation, 1972 DuKE L.J. 595.
119. Sullivan and Wiley suggest that even arrangements defended as attempts to rem-
edy market failures may be inappropriate for private parties to undertake and perhaps
therefore must be left to the legislatures. Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 64, at 324.
120. See text accompanying notes 99-110 supra.
121. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts
[in determining legality under the antitrust laws]. This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of
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Presumably defendants are well situated to assess the conse-
quences of their actions, and if they intend anticompetitive results,
this is a strong indication that such results are likely to occur.
Evidence that actions with possible procompetitive motiva-
tions were actually committed in bad faith is extremely probative.
The timing and sequence of events may show that the defendant's
conduct was actually a specific response to a competitive chal-
lenge.12 2 If the practices in question involve some form of stan-
dard-setting or certification, the crucial question is whether the
criteria employed are objective and reasonable; if not, it can be in-
ferred that there will be few procompetitive gains to balance the
anticompetitive effects of withholding approval to the nonconform-
ing competitors.123 Similarly, if the scheme in question involves
some form of self-regulation, an inquiry into the availability of
procedural safeguards will indicate the fairness of the standards
and the likelihood that they will have net procompetitive effects.12'
In considering the purpose of the arrangements, two caveats
are in order. First, there need not be a noncommercial purpose to
the arrangement. A commercially motivated restriction, which ex-
pands or improves a market or creates efficiencies, will be lawful as
long as its effect is to enhance competition. Second, an inquiry into
purpose and motive is unlikely to be conclusive. Often several
motivations exist for a particular action, and it will be difficult for
plaintiffs to show that an anticompetitive purpose was the princi-
pal aim of the arrangement.2
2 5
(2) Availability of Less Restrictive Alternatives. The rationale
advanced here for providing exceptions to the per se treatment of
certain restraints is that they also may have substantial procompe-
titive effects. Less justification exists, however, for approving prac-
tices when there are reasonable alternatives available to the defen-
dants, particularly those with similar procompetitive effects that
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
122. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978), in which allegations that the defendant engaged in intimidation and coercion were
sufficient to justify a denial of a motion for summary judgment. The defendants argued that
acts to discourage physicians from performing abortions at a local clinic were intended only
to insure a minimum standard of care.
123. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
124. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Linseman v. World
Hockey Ass'n., 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
125. "The primary problem with evidence of purpose-to put the matter bluntly-is
that in modern antitrust cases, such evidence will often reflect what counsel advise business-
men their purpose should have been." Pitofsky, supra note 115, at 35.
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are less restrictive on marketplace conduct.12 Indeed, the existence
of such alternatives suggests that the proffered procompetitive jus-
tifications may not be the real motivation behind the restraints
and that their imposition will have an overall anticompetitive
impact.
The consideration of other alternatives should go beyond the
mere inquiry into whether the plaintiff is able to contemplate an
arrangement that might be less restrictive.2 The defendant's
scheme need not be the best imaginable; rather, alternatives are
examined only to shed light on the probable effect the restraint
will have on competition. This test, therefore, asks whether the re-
strictions are reasonably necessary to insure their procompetitive
purposes. A finding that reasonable alternatives exist is an element
to be weighed by the court in determining the likely net impact of
the restraint on competition.
(3) Market Power of the Defendants. In some situations the
market share of the defendants may be highly relevant. As Profes-
sor Sullivan has indicated, the cases can be divided into two cate-
gories, depending upon whether market power is necessary to
achieve the alleged beneficial purposes of the restraint. 12 8 If market
power is essential to obtain the benefits of the restraints, its con-
sideration is less important since the benefits of the arrangement
will multiply in tandem with its harms as market power increases.
Thus, the court can assume that the defendants have the requisite
power to do both harm and good and need only weigh the pro- and
anticompetitive kspects of the conduct. This situation is most
likely to occur with arrangements designed to make or improve a
market, as these may require the participation of a substantial
share of competitors to be effective.
29
If, however, the procompetitive benefits can be attained re-
126. For opinions holding that a restraint can be justified as procompetitive only if it
is no more restrictive than necessary to achieve its procompetitive purposes, see White Mo-
tor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Siegel v. Chick-
en Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Sandura
Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 856 (6th Cir. 1964).
127. See M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTrTRUST 705-08 (1973). The Supreme
Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.29 (1977), has indi-
cated that at least in regard to vertical restraints, the least restrictive alternative need not
be employed. See also American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248-
49 (3d Cir. 1975).
128. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 50, at § 69.
129. Sullivan offers as an example the situation in Board of Trade in which the alleged
purpose of the arrangement, to perfect the daytime market, could be achieved only to the
extent those acting in consent possessed market power. Id.
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gardless of market power, an inquiry into market share is essential
to determine the severity of the anticompetitive effects. Such an
analysis is likely to be most needed in cases in which procompeti-
tive results are claimed to stem from efficiencies due to restraints
ancillary to a partial integration. If market power is insubstantial,
the danger of any harm may be so slight that only a very modest
showing of procompetitive benefits would be needed to justify the
restraint. On the other hand, if a significant share of the market is
involved, it would be extremely unlikely that any procompetitive
benefits would be sufficient to outweigh harmful market effects. In-
quiry into market share thus may be crucial in considering conduct
by new entrants or failing competitors that would be unlawful if
undertaken by more dominant firms.-1 0
Once the defendants have presented justifications for their
conduct, the court's task is to balance these against the restraint's
harmful impact on competition. To what extent the plaintiffs must
show an anticompetitve effect depends on the familiarity of the
court with the restraint, its similarity to traditional per se conduct,
and the strength of the procompetitive rationale. At one extreme,
for example, are professionals who engage in classic per se illegal
conduct such as price-fixing or market division and fail to offer a
convincing procompetitive justification. A strong presumption of il-
legality then exists, and the court should require at most a very
modest demonstration of anticompetitive effect. At the other end
of the spectrum is conduct involving an indirect restraint in an un-
usual market context, in which the defendant has offered a plausi-
ble procompetitive rationale as well as evidence of good faith, the
absence of less restrictive alternatives, and perhaps insubstantial
market power. For the plaintiff to succeed in such a situation, a
full-blown Rule of Reason case must be proved, with a showing of
anticompetitive purpose, effect, and power.
E. Application of Intermediate-Level Scrutiny to the
Professions
The preceding framework is useful in explaining several recent
antitrust cases dealing with restraints by professionals. Mardiro-
sian v. American Institute of Architects"' involved an ethical
130. This inquiry can be conducted in a more summary manner than that conducted
in a § 2 monopolization case since the issue is simply whether the defendants possess sub-
stantial market power and not whether they possess monopoly power. Id.
131. 474 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1979).
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standard of a professional architects' association that prohibited
members from seeking a commission on a project for which an-
other architect already had been selected. The court, after declin-
ing to rule that the standard was per se illegal, observed that the
restraint had clear anticompetitive effects. Despite the defendants'
justifications that the restraints promoted the integrity of con-
tracts and prevented deception and conflicts of interest, the court
held that the standard was overbroad and would not directly en-
hance competition.1 2 Because it concluded that a procompetitive
justification was lacking, the court had little difficulty in granting
the plaintiff partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. 13'
A similar analysis was employed in United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc.1 34 in which a test for "facial unreasonableness"
was applied in considering the membership criteria of a county-
wide real estate multiple listing service. Noting that the potential
for significant competitive harm existed, the Fifth Circuit dis-
cussed the way to conduct an examination to determine whether
the requirements might be reasonable ancillary restraints with
overall procompetitive benefits. According to the court, assuming
that the defendants had market power, the inquiry must focus on
(1) whether the restraints had legitimate justifications in the com-
petitive needs of the association itself, and (2) whether the require-
ments were "reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the
legitimate goals and narrowly tailored to that end." If the re-
straints failed these tests, they could be condemned without proof
of past effect because "[t]hey have, in essence, an anticompetitive
effect which has no countervailing procompetitive benefit."135
The framework for intermediate-level scrutiny suggested here
also provides coherence and guidance to recent antitrust decisions
regarding restraints by health professionals. For example, in Vir-
ginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield,13 6 a physi-
cian-controlled health care plan refused to pay psychotherapists'
fees unless the treatment provided was supervised and billed
through a physician. The Fourth Circuit, citing Broadcast Music
132. Id. at 650.
133. Id. at 651.
134. 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
135. Id. at 1375. The court concluded that the membership criteria were unreasonably
overbroad but remanded the case to the district court to consider questions of market power
and jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. The "facial unreasonableness" test was cited ap-
provingly in United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., [1980] 5 TRADE RzG. REP.
(CCH) 63,698 (S.D.N.Y.).
136. 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (Feb. 24, 1981).
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and Goldfarb, agreed with the lower court that per se analysis was
inappropriate "[b]ecause of the special considerations involved in
the delivery of health services. 1817 The Fourth Circuit rejected the
district court's finding, however, that clinical psychologists and
psychiatrists do not compete, and instead concluded that the Blue
Shield arrangement, by requiring the two professions "to act as
one,"15B necessarily limited competition. The court acknowledged
that there may be valid reasons for requiring an examination and
consultation by a physician-viz., to ensure that persons suffering
from physical ailments do not undertake needless psychother-
apy.139 The court, however, was not convinced that the restraint in
fact was designed to enhance quality of care. The Blue Shield re-
quirements, by allowing billings through any physician and not
just those who treated mental and nervous disorders, clearly did
not provide this element of supervision. The restraint, therefore,
lacked a convincing procompetitive justification and was unlawful.
A similar intermediate-level analysis was attempted in United
States v. American Society of Anesthesiologists.1 40 The anesthesi-
ologists had adopted and published a "relative value guide" in
which medical procedures were associated with a numerical unit
that could be converted to dollars. This scheme allowed member
physicians to compare the relative values of a whole range of medi-
cal services. The guide can become a fee schedule merely by plug-
ging in a conversion factor to multiply the number of units for
each procedure and then calculating the amount to be charged.
Such a guide, established by competitors in a commercial context,
probably would constitute illegal price-fixing because the dissemi-
nation of information and agreement on the establishment of price
structures usually leads to price uniformity and stabilization.
The court, however, declined to declare the guide per se illegal,
considering it to be a response to the rapid development of anes-
thesiology as a full-blown medical specialty and the consequent
need for a "cohesive, internally consistent, logical and appropriate
137. 624 F.2d at 484.
138. Id. at 485.
139. Id.
140. 473 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). For a good discussion of the Anesthesiologists
decision, see 33 V~m. L. REv. 233 (1980).
141. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 154-61, 173-77 (D.N.J. 1915), aff'd, 251 U.S.
417 (1920); Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules
and the Sherman Act, 1978 DuKE L.J. 645, 689-96.
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method"142 for arriving at fees.
The court then proceeded to analyze the restraint under the
Rule of Reason. It concluded that generally anesthesiologists do
not compete with each other for patients. Instead, anesthesiolo-
gists' services are paid for by insurers, and there was no evidence
that insurers were coerced into accepting the guides. Furthermore,
and perhaps most significantly, the guides were published without
conversion factors, and no evidence existed that physicians or
third-party payers used them without making their own adjust-
ments to establish prices. Thus, the guides were seen as an accept-
able means of describing anesthesiology services. As the court
stated, "When viewed in the context of this unusual market, it
would seem that defendant's activities tended to promote the in-
terplay of such competitive forces as existed in the area."
1 43
The court's assessment is not entirely satisfying. It is difficult
to see why a less restrictive means, such as the establishment of
relative value scales by each insurer, as opposed to the anesthesiol-
ogist society, would not have served the same procompetitive pur-
poses without running the risk of dampening price competition
among the doctors. 44 The point here, however, is that although the
court's ultimate decision may have been unwise, it at least followed
a framework of analysis that made decisionmaking manageable.
The court went astray only when it failed to subject the defen-
dant's rationale to the more rigorous scrutiny it deserved. As in the
Blue Shield case, a knee-jerk characterization of the restraints as
per se illegal was rejected. The court's next step was to consider
possible procompetitive justifications, and here it concluded that
the guides served to improve the market by facilitating compari-
sons of the anesthesiologists' services. That this conclusion may
have been mistaken can be traced to the failure of the court to
consider in greater depth the merits of this justification and
whether reasonable less restrictive alternatives could accomplish
the same purposes.
The complexities of a market in which third-party insurers
play a substantial role also explains the Maricopa court's reluc-
tance to declare a maximum price-fixing arrangment illegal per
142. United States v. American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, 473 F. Supp. 147, 158
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
143. Id. at 160.
144. See Havighurst & Kissam, The Antitrust Implications of Relative Value Studies
in Medicine, 4 J. HLMTH POL., POL'Y & L. 48 (1979).
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se.145 As the analysis presented here suggests, however, it was a
mistake for the Maricopa court to assume that because conduct in
the professional context does not fall within the per se category, it
must necessarily be subjected to a full-scale Rule of Reason analy-
sis with the plaintiff bearing an almost insurmountable burden of
proof. Instead, the court should have required the defendants to
present some procompetitive rationale for their arrangement.
Judge Larson noted in his dissent that the defendants' only justifi-
cation-that the arrangement served to cut costs-was not con-
vincing since there were no real incentives for physicians to limit
fees.
146
Maximum fee arrangements, in some situations, may be
procompetitive.14 7 If instituted by insurers they may be reasonably
ancillary to arrangements for new health care financing that in-
crease competition in the insurance market.1 48 Such restraints im-
posed by physician groups without market power may be procom-
petitive in the health care provider market, particularly if they are
ancillary to the formation of health maintenance organizations. In
Maricopa, however, the restraints do not appear to have been an-
cillary to any legitimate joint venture. The defendants in that situ-
ation created neither a new health care provider entity nor a new
insurer plan, but instead only contracted out coverage to existing
health insurers. Thus, it is doubtful that there were any substan-
tial procompetitive effects to balance the harmful impact of the
restraint, and the arrangement should have been declared
unlawful.14'
F. The Implications for Health and Safety
A central tenet in this Article's analysis is the view that re-
straints by health care professionals can be analyzed in a managea-
145. See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra.
146. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Ass'n, [1980-1] Trade Cas. 1 63,239, at
78,164 (9th Cir. 1980) (Larson, J., dissenting).
147. For a discussion of the procompetitive aspects of maximum price restraints in a
related market, prescription drugs, see Note, supra note 64, at 518-26, which suggests that
pharmacy agreements may be procompetitive by (1) increasing price sensitivity in the mar-
ket, (2) reducing consumer search time, (3) introducing a sophisticated buyer likely to bar-
gain on the behalf of unsophisticated consumers, and (4) creating a new market in which
insurers and pharmacies bargain directly.
148. See Kallstrom, supra note 141, at 659-65.
149. Several commentators have suggested that the purpose of FMCs is to preserve
independent fee-for-service practice by setting entry-discouraging prices that will deter
other forms of third-party competition. See Havighurst, supra note 15, at 716, 768-77; Kall-
strom, supra note 141, at 659-65.
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ble way as long as courts focus solely on the overall effect of the
conduct on competition. As demonstrated, this view has been
strongly affirmed in recent cases.150 Nevertheless, some concern
may remain that this framework could involve harm to public
safety and health as it allows professionals too little room to take
legitimate action aimed at assuring quality of care. Close examina-
tion of this issue suggests, however, that these fears are misplaced.
To begin with, it is a very simple matter for defendants to
conjure up health and safety rationales for anticompetitive con-
duct that may in fact be primarily economically motivated. As
early as the 1943 AMA case,151 physicians attempted to justify re-
straints on practice as necessary to protect the public from low
quality care. This is not to suggest that legitimate quality of care
concerns do not play a part in influencing the behavior of profes-
sionals; undoubtedly in most cases there are several motivations,
commercial and otherwise, for the challenged conduct. It is impor-
tant to bear in mind, however, that it is easy for professionals to
construct a smokescreen of health and safety rationales, with the
result that the need for anticompetitive restraints is likely to be
highly exaggerated.
Furthermore, the framework proposed here leaves ample room
for continuation of legitimate practices instituted by health profes-
sionals to ensure the quality of professional services. For example,
certification programs that operate fairly and objectively, as long
as they are limited to categorizing and rating providers, should
have little difficulty in showing they are procompetitive attempts
at improving the market by providing otherwise unavailable infor-
mation to consumers. 152 Similarly, narrowly drafted rules by pro-
fessional societies aimed at policing false and deceptive advertising
can be justified as reasonably necessary to enable the public to
make accurate and informed decisions.15 3 Insurer-initiated profes-
150. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra. In the early 1970s some lower courts
held that certain vertical restraints may be justified in the marketing of potentially danger-
ous products in order to ensure quality control or prevent misuse. See, e.g., Tripoli Co. v.
Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970). United
States v. Safety First Prods. Corp. [1972] Trade Cas. 74,223 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Professional
Engineers, however, expressly limited the holding in those cases to restraints that have no
anticompetitive effects and are reasonably ancillary to the seller's main purpose of protect-
ing the public from harm or itself from product liability. 435 U.S. at 696 n.22.
151. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
152. Havighurst, supra note 39, at 362-68; see Kissam, supra note 64, at 156-66. In
general, accreditation and certification are likely to enlarge the market by being "output-
expanding" as opposed to "output-restricting." See Elzinga, supra note 117, at 112-16.
153. Thus, in In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1009 (1979), afi'd, 638 F.2d
960 [Vol. 34:927
ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
sional arrangements requiring relative value scales and maximum
price agreements also may be viewed as procompetitive because
they create new markets or enlarge existing ones.' The common
element in these practices is that they all tend to expand and im-
prove the range of consumer choices. The basic premise is clearly
enunciated in Professional Engineers: "The assumption that com-
petition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market
recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety,
and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably af-
fected by the free opportunity to select among alternative of-
fers."155 If for some reason the market for health care services is
functioning poorly, the appropriate response in most cases should
be practices aimed at making that market perform better, and not
restraints designed to circumvent it altogether.
Nevertheless, some situations may occur in which the market
simply cannot be improved enough to function satisfactorily. In
those situations, antitrust laws need not apply at all; but the deci-
sion that market conditions require exceptional treatment must be
left to the legislatures. The state action doctrine exempts from an-
titrust scrutiny conduct pursuant to a state regulatory program,
thus allowing states to impose minimum standards of practice and
training through licensing schemes. To qualify for the exemption,
the restraint must be "'clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed as state policy"' and "'actively supervised' by the State
itself."1 56 Congress, either expressly or by implication, also may ex-
empt conduct from the antitrust laws. For example, the enactment
of a national health planning scheme resulted from the recognition
that cooperation among hospitals may be necessary to contain ris-
ing health costs. Thus, certain planning and other joint activities
by providers may be impliedly immune from antitrust liability.
15 7
443 (2d Cir. 1980), the Federal Trade Commission acknowledged that "an ethical precept
narrowly directed toward false or deceptive advertising and unfair solicitation may enhance
competition by insuring the communication of accurate information in a manner that allows
it to be processed unburdened by unscrupulous practices."
154. See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
155. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
156. California Retail Liquor Dealer's Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980). See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
157. National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross, 628 F.2d 1050
(8th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Jan 27, 1981); Huron Valley Hosp.,
Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Miller, Antitrust and Certifi-
cate of Need: Health Systems Agencies, the Planning Act, and Regulatory Capture, 68
Gao. L.J. 873, 888-92 (1980); Walbolt & Pankau, Antitrust, Public Health-Care Institu-
tions, and the Developing Law, 1980 ARiz. ST. L.J. 385, 390-92.
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Finally, it must be recognized that health professionals are
permitted to join together in good faith efforts to persuade the leg-
islatures that, in particular circumstances, regulatory schemes em-
bodying restraints to ensure health and safety are required.es In
those situations in which legitimate quality-of-care concerns can-
not be handled by a competitive arrangement, professional socie-
ties are free to petition for a more satisfactory, albeit anticompeti-
tive, legislative solution.
V. CONCLUSION
The application of antitrust laws to professional activity will
not only increase during the 1980s, but will also become more com-
plex as enforcement agencies and private litigants move beyond
the blatant restraints that have existed for so long in this area of
commerce. Courts will be faced with difficult issues involving re-
strictions on entry to health care institutions for certain providers,
increasingly sophisticated boycott activity, and complex relation-
ships between providers of services and third-party payers, to
name a few. The importance of rigorous antitrust enforcement as
the primary vehicle for policing the health services market cannot
be overemphasized in a period of regulatory reform like the pre-
sent. If command-type regulation is peeled away, thereby allowing
competitive forces to come into play, it is absolutely essential that
antitrust be available and used to insure that fair and open compe-
tition can prevail.
This Article has suggested that courts adopt an intermediate
level of scrutiny, between per se and Rule of Reason analysis.
Under this analysis, a rebuttable presumption of illegality attaches
to those practices which in other contexts are per se illegal. The
weight of this presumption varies with the familiarity of the court
with the restraint, its similarity to traditional per se conduct, and
the strength of the procompetitive justification.
This analytical approach is desirable for two reasons. First,
courts are reluctant to apply commercial per se rules of illegality to
professional restraints, and with good reason. Professional prac-
tices do differ from purely commercial transactions. At the same
time, however, some professionals do engage in highly anticompeti-
tive practices. Courts ought to have a test for assessing these prac-
tices that is less cumbersome than full-blown Rule of Reason anal-
158. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Pres-
idents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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ysis. Second, a truly competitive market for health services will
provide better assurance of high quality care and reasonable prices
than a market controlled by dominant professional groups. Compe-
tition will create incentives for providers and insurers to dissemi-
nate more information to consumers-information about prices,
availability, billing procedures, and provider qualifications. Also,
competition may encourage development of alternative forms of
delivering services, particularly those that have the potential for
increasing efficiency and reducing costs. By focusing on the
procompetitive effects of professionally imposed restraints, courts
will be able to review objectively both the economic and social con-
sequences of the challenged activity.
An intermediate level of review is not a radical departure from
existing case law. Nevertheless, recognizing that it exists and spell-
ing out how it should be conducted is important for the further
development of the law in this area. Adoption of this method of
analysis means that anticompetitive restraints on professional
practice, which do not trigger per se analysis, may be successfully
challenged. More importantly, this method of analysis insures that
the debate on the benefits of anticompetitive restraints will not be
sidetracked. Undocumented and emotional claims that the re-
straints are necessary to preserve quality of care will be insufficient
to move the analysis into the Rule of Reason mode, or worse, out
of the courts altogether. The intermediate review suggested is
grounded in the bedrock of traditional economic and market analy-
sis and leaves to the legislatures the difficult task of deciding when
market forces should be subsumed by regulation. Not only is this
approach consistent with contemporary political reality, it also re-
flects longstanding legal doctrines pertaining to the appropriate
roles of judges and lawmakers.
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